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ABSTRACT
Most students of international relations feel that recognition of a new
government is primarily a political act. However, it has been contended
notably by P rofessor Lauterpacht that the act is basically legal in nature. A
study of the problem of Canadian recognition of Communist China shows that
in Canada the question has been considered from a political rather than legal
point of view .
In Canada there was agreement during the period under considera
tion, 1949-60, that certain criteria must be attained by a government before
it can expect to be recognized. Once these conditions have been m et, how
ev er, a government does not have a right to be recognized nor do other states
have the obligation to recognize the new government. A state w ill accord r e 
cognition when it feels its national self-interests will be best served by that act.
Neither the Liberal nor the Conservative administrations which held
office in the period felt that Canada could gain more than it lost by granting
recognition to Red China. As a result the Peking regime was denied Canadian
recognition. The C .C . F . party interpreted the political stiuation differently
and decided that recognition would have been a wise course of action.

j

Several conditions in the political realm influenced the thought of
Canadian political parties on this issu e. The same realities, however, did not
evince sim ilar reactions. Among the factors which had to be considered were
the attitudes of Canada's a llie s, the effect recognition would have on the rest of
A sia and the possibilities of expanding Canadian trade.
iii
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Whatever the views of the political parties w ere, they were based
on political m otives. The problem of recognition of Communist China was
not a legal problem in Canada.

/
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PREFACE
There has been some dispute as to whether recognition is primarily
a legal or political problem in the field of international relations. The pur
pose of this th esis is to attempt to show that as far as^the Canadian consider
ation of recognition of the Central government of the Peoples' Republic of
China is concerned the problem is primarily political in nature. A study of
the positions of Canadian political parties on this matter will prove that
political rather than legal arguments enjoy prim acy.
Chapter I is an introductory chapter which will discuss the problem
of recognition in international relations. Also included is a brief discussion
of Sino-Canadian relations and Canadian foreign policy which is intended to
provide some background m aterial for the discussion. The next chapter will
present an historical outline of the problem. Each following chapter will be
devoted to the arguments of a particular political party with regard to the
problem and an attempt to show that these arguments are politically rooted.
Social Credit thought on the subject w ill be included as a section of the chapter
on Progressive Conservative attitudes since it is most sim ilar and does not
warrant a chapter of its own. The period to be considered extends from
October 1949 to the end of 1960.

|Pr->ir»-y
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I
INTRODUCTION
1. The Question of Recognition in International Law
The recognition of the new government of a state which has already
been recognized is the free act by which one or several states
acknowledge that a person or group of persons are capable of
binding the State which they claim to represent, and witness their
intention to enter into relations with them. 1
So reads Article 10 of the Resolution adopted by the Institute of International
Law at B ru ssels, A pril, 1936 concerning the recognition of new states and
new governments. This seem s to be a fairly straight-forward doctrine not
calculated to raise great controversy in foreign relations. However, the
question is rendered much more complex by other considerations.
Whether or not a new state Q or new state new government can
be injected mutatis mutandis!] has actually begun to exist is a
pure question of fact; and as international law does not provide
any machinery for authoritative declaration on this question, it
is one which every other state must answer for itself as best
it ca n .2
The question, although usually answered ea sily , can present problem s. P r e
mature recognition constitutes interference in the internal affairs of the state
and as long as a struggle continues, recognition is premature. "On the other
hand mere persistence of the old state government in a struggle which has
^The Law of Nations, C ases. Documents and Notes, edited by Herbert
W . B riggs, (New York: F .S . Crofts and C o ., 1944), p .78.
2 j .L . B rierly, The Law of Nations, (5th ed.; Oxford: The Clarendon
P r e s s , 1955), p . 129.
1
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2 ,
obviously become hopeless is not a sufficient cause for withholding i t . ”3
Two schools of thought exist on just what recognition rep resents. One
school (led by Professor Lauterpacht) holds that recognition is a constitutive
act. Through recognition a government becomes an international entity,
subject to international privileges and obligations. This interpretation leads
to difficulties in many instances. For exam ple, what is the position of a
government recognized by some states and not by others? We might be forced
to say that an unrecognized government has no rights or duties. Actual expe
rience has shown u s, however, that while non-recognition makes the enforce
ment of rights and duties more difficult, governments do have a legal
existence before recognition.
The second or declaratory school of thought (including w riters such
as Brierly and Briggs) holds that recognition does not bring a government into
existence but m erely acknowledges the fact of its existence. Recognition ack
nowledges a hitherto uncertain fact and accepts the consequences of that
acknowledgement. The granting of recognition does not affect the status of a
government from which recognition has been withheld under international law.
However, recognition is important in the domestic law of a state withholding
it from another. If recognition is not present, a court in a non-recognizing
country w ill not recognize the legality of the acts of the non-recognized
government. Thus recognition here has a quasi-constitutive effect. Inter
national law, however, cannot refuse to recognize a fait accom pli.
The present condition of international law makes possible different
view s on the application of law to the same rea litie s. All interpretations are
Sjjrierly, p . 130.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

not equally correct, but there is no authority to determine who is right and who
is not. However, certain criteria have been set down which are a guide to
whether a state should be recognized or not. These are both positive and nega
tive in nature. A government which is in effective control of a certain area of
territory and is capable of maintaining that control is said to be worthy of
recognition. It must be determined whether a government indeed can bind the
state to its com mitments. On the other hand, certain conditions are irrelevant
in considering recognition. ’'What form of government a state should adopt and
whether it should replace an existing government, are domestic matters with
which other states are not concerned."4 On this same point, B rierly further
states that "for the recognizing state it is irrelevant that a new state may have
come into existence by civil war, or that a government may be a revolutionary
government .” 5
One over-riding consideration, however, places the finer points of
international law in a secondary position. This aspect is the fact that recog
nition is a political act. Paul Reuter has this to say about it:
recognition in international law is not concerned with the relatively
simple de facto situations of private life . To recognize a power
(whether recognizing a state or recognizing a government) is always
in some part a creative activity. Power rests on collective psycho
logy* and to ’recognize’ from outside an internal situation as
existing helps to make it become a reality. Where there are
’situations’ of this importance and of this kind, one cannot simply
say that recognition is a judicial act of a purely technical nature.6
Thus although recognition does not imply approval or disapproval of a
4B rierly, p . 129.
^Brierly, p . 139.
®Paul R euter, International Institutions, tran s. J .M . Chapman,
(London: George Allen and Unwin L td ., 1958), p . 97.
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governmental system or the people composing a government, another state may
withhold recognition because it dislikes that system . A government may choose
to adhere to or ignore the particular facets of international law that are valid
for the situation as best suits its political m otives. "It is a rule of Interna
tional Law that no new state has a right as against other states to be recognized
by them, and that no state has a duty to recognize a new state

Each state is

free to choose for itse lf whether or not to recognize a government and this
choice is made usually on the basis of political self-in terest. Recognition can
thus be withheld to show disapproval or accorded to aid the stability of that
government. The policy of President Wilson in Central America and of several
nations in the present situation concerning Communist China illustrates that
position. It might be added at this juncture that it is difficult to maintain non
recognition of a strong state.
Phillip Brown str e sse s the political nature of recognition even more
strongly.

/

No branch of international law has been so badly misunderstood
and needlessly confused as that of the recognition of new states
and new governm ents. Recognition has been the football of
diplomats who have made it mean anything that suited their
purpose. It has certainly been grossly abused as a weapon of
diplomatic pressure and intervention. 8
L ater, in the same article Brown goes on to say;
Another basic principle is the major prem ise that the function of
recognition is a voluntary, free, political, diplomatic function.
There is no supreme law, no legal compulsion to constrain any
government to accord or refuse recognition. 9
7B rig g s, p .78.
^Phillip M. Brown, "The Legal Effects of Recognition", American
Journal of International Law, XLIV (October 1950), 617.
9Brown, p . 619.
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5
The whole sphere of recognition is obscured by political considerations.
It is delayed, refused or granted for other than legal reasons., For exam ple,
we may consider the withholding of recognition of the Soviet Union by the W est
ern Powers after the revolution of 1917. Economic considerations were of the
prime importance. Commercial agreements have the effect of a qualified recog
nition and such agreements were in existence between the Soviet Union and such

Western Powers as Great Britain and France. The United States while refus
ing to recognize the Soviet Union still entered into direct negotiations with her
and signed the Kellogg Pact of 1928 along with the Soviet Union.
These last remarks pose another question. How does one reconcile
non-recognition with co-membership in a pact or international body? The
method actually is quite sim ple. A nation simply states that its action, v is -a v is the non-recognized government, does not imply recognition.
It has been generally held that the presence of non-recognized
states and governments in the United Nations is to be regarded
' as a special conventional arrangement that does not imply full
recognition by other m em bers. 10
In considering recognition, states are som etim es confronted with the
problem of governments which seem to be unwilling to fulfill their inter national obligations. In such an eventuality should recognition be accorded?
The case of the Soviet Union which got recognition although it would not accept
the general principles of international law seem s to indicate that non
conformity to international law does not always rule out the possibility of recog
nition. Soviet R ussia was given the rights of international law ( e .g . control
over public property of the state in other states, not liable to law suits etc.)
by those who accorded recognition but gave no indication of the intention to
■^Brown, p . 621.
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respect the legal rights of others. This state of affairs seem s to point up the
statement made above concerning the difficulty of failing to recognize a strong
sta te .

y
A government for various reasons may not want to extend complete

recognition to a new government. It must, however, recognize that govern
ment’s ex isten ce. To deny this is against common se n se . It is not a question
of having relations, for relations must ex ist, but it is a question of the nature
and extent of these relations. Implied recognition is more reasonably ex
plained as m erely the n ecessity of frankly admitting the existence of a de facto
government. "It would seem clear that the recognition of a new government
is of much greater significance from the political point of view than from the
le g a l." 11 If one makes any kind of acknowledgement of the de facto situation,
som e type of commitment will have to result from the relations which do
e x is t.
There is not unanimity among students of international law that recog
nition is chiefly political. The strongest arguments for the legal nature of the
act come from P rofessor Lauterpacht. Stated briefly his belief is that there
are certain legal requirements that must be obtained by a government aspir
ing to recognition. Once the requirements are satisfied, that government has
a right to recognition and all others have the duty to recognize it. This theory,
however, does not seem to be in tune with the realities of the international
scene and has been c r it ic iz e d on t h e s e g r o u n d s . In the w o rd s o f J o s e f L .
Kunz, "this assertion of a right to recognition and a duty to recognize, is c e r v
1f.
tainly untenable as not being in accord with positive international law ." 12
11Brown, p . 633.
12

Josef L . Kunz, "Critical Remarks on Lauterpacht’s Recognition in
International Law", American Journal of International Law, XLIV (October
1950), 713.
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There is a difference between the political and legal aspects of recog
nition. The former is a strictly discretionary act of the state; the latter, a
determination of whether certain requirements have been m et. Once the deter
mination of requirements has been made, it does not follow n ecessarily that
recognition will be accorded or denied.
Lauterpacht is criticized for seeming to be a wishful thinker. If
recognition is a purely political act, then that surely would be a defect in
international law. Thus he sets out to prove the juridical nature of recognition.
Being a member of the constitutive school of thought, Lauterpacht feels that an
unrecognized state and its acts are n u llities. His argument is that if there is
no duty to recognize a government, the whole problem of recognition passes out
of the sphere of law. It would seem that on a purely speculative lev el, Lauterpacht's views may have considerable m erit. They cannot, however, be accept
ed in the light of the realities of international behaviour; e .g . Chinese
Communist intervention in Korea was by no means a nullity.
When a realization of this cardinal principle, that recognition is pri
m arily a political act, is gained, it is much easier to understand situations
which on the surface seem to be irreconcilable to fact, e .g . recognizing the
Nationalist government on Formosa as the government of all China. All con
siderations and evaluations concerning recognition in this paper will be based
on the political nature of the act.
2 . Sino-Canadian Relations
Sino-Canadian intercourse has never been very ex ten siv e.1** On the
■^Material in this section is based on G .P .d e T . Glazebrook, Canadian
External Relations, (Toronto: Oxford U . P r e ss, 1950), and A .B .M .L ow er,
Canada and the Far East 1940 (New York International Secretariat, Institute of
Pacific Relations, 1940).
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political scen e, it has not been necessary to enter into protracted negotiations
on any m atter. Canada has been represented in China since 1906 though at
that date the representation concerned matters of trade only. It was in that
year that the first Commercial Office was opened in Shanghai. In 1909, M r.
Angus McLean became the first Canadian Trade Commissioner in China.
On the whole it may be said, despite the sparsity of Sino-Canadian
relations, that an amiable attitude has existed on both sid es. Such rapport as
existed was evidenced in the goodwill of the citizenry of both countries rather
than in the governments. This attitude was best exemplified by Canadians in
their support of China in her wars against Japan in 1931 and again in 1937.
Sympathy was displayed for China in many Canadian quarters. Many organi
zations tried to foster a boycott of Japanese trad e.
Probably the chief cause of Canadian goodwill towards China was that
many hundreds of Canadian mi

ionaries representing several Christian deno

minations were at work in China. The m issionary effort was quite large con
sidering the size of Canada. Although the number of converts was unimpres
sive compared to the effort and expenditure put forth, the contribution in the
form of u n iversities, schools and hospitals was laudable. These concrete
manifestations of help, along with the introduction of western culture instilled
goodwill for Canada into the many Chinese who were affected. Probably the
greatest boost in Sino-Canadian mutual goodwill was the sterling character
and intellectual prowess of the m issionaries them selves who represented some
of the finest elem ents of the Canadian population. Their influence upon govern
ment must have counted for something. Chiang Kai-shek him self is a Christian.
Even if the m issionary effort was accepted as beneficial by most Chinese, and
this is debatable, it would not im press the Communists.
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If the general attitude of the Canadian populace was warm towards
China, the attitude of the Canadian government was at best luke-warm . During
the Manchurian c r is is , Prim e Minister Bennet said it was not w ise to place
blame anywhere since Canada knew little of the situation. China got no Canadian
support at all since Canada wanted to retain Japanese friendship. The lead of
the United Kingdom was followed and an arms embargo placed on both China
and Japan in 1933. Later during the Sino-Japanese war, Canadian trade actually
prospered because of that war and Canada did not overtly support China in the
League of Nations.
The treatment of Chinese in Canada was not calculated to promote
understanding. An early influx of Chinese into British Columbia aroused the
white people of that area. Thus the government was prodded into passing d is
criminatory legislation in the form of a poll tax on Chinese and finally in 1923
the Chinese Immigration A ct. This certainly could not have aroused anything
but resentment among Chinese. The treatment often given visiting Chinese
officials and distinguished people by immigration officials was again not calcu
lated to foster amity. Chinese in British Columbia especially were denied
civ il rights, as they could not vote, hold office, e tc. On the whole the treat
ment of the Chinese as immigrants and citizens is a rather shameful chapter
in our history. "China has a standing grievance against Canada on account of
the slight on her national honour
S in o -C a n a d ia n tr a d e h a s n e v e r b e e n of an y g r e a t m a g n itu d e . P r io r

to World War I this trade was almost insignificant and imports to Canada
exceeded her exports. After World War I imports and exports reached a peak
^ A .R .M . Lower, Canada and the Far East - 1940, (New York:
International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), p . 80.
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in 1926. Exports were then substantially higher than imports and trade was of
som e significance. Ironically, British Columbia, and to a le ss e r extent the
P r a ir ie s, were the chief beneficiaries.
Finally, it must be noted that China, under Chiang K ai-shek was an
ally against Japan in World War

n.

No one can deny the tenacity with which

she fought nor ignore the privations which she suffered. Many Canadians do
not wish to repay Chiang K ai-shek with a slap in the face for his valiant effort
in the fight against J apan. ^
3.

Canadian Foreign Policy Goals

Taking note of Canada's historical relations with China, one could
ea sily wonder what difference it made to Canada which government it recog
nized as the government of China. It must be said that this question of
recognition takes on significance only as an aspect of foreign policy in general
and the objectives of that policy. The question of entering into relations with
China so as to be able to transact business is of little importance. As H .F .
Angus pointed out, "But this was not an urgent reason for there was not much
business to transact and the friendly services of the other Commonwealth
countries were available."

16

To attempt a discussion of Canadian foreign policy in a few brief para
graphs seem s almost fruitless considering the scope of that field . However, a
resume of some of the more salient aspects of Canadian foreign policy will
perhaps establish a frame of reference within which the more particular problem
*^A.R.M . Lower, Canada and the Far East - 1940, (New York: Inter
national Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), p .80.
16

H .F . Angus, Canada and the Far E ast, 1940-1953, (Toronto:
U niversity of Toronto P ress [under auspices of the Canadian Institute of Inter
national Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations^ , 1953), p .36.
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of recognition of Communist China may be better evaluated. The first aim of
any government in foreign policy is national self-interest and security. It is
not necessary to quote statesm en to prove that th is,is as true of Canada as of
any other country. Ordinarily a question of recognition of a new government
would not be considered a matter vitally concerning national self-in terest or
security. This is not the case in respect of Communist China. Many possible
ramifications which might stem from such recognition must be weighed.
It is also possible to state without fear of being challenged in other
than Communist countries, that along with promoting national self-in terest and
security, world order and peace form the cornerstone of Canadian foreign
policy. The quest for peace indeed encom passes national self-in terest and
security and is at one with these objectives. Thus one must ask him self what
recognition w ill do to foster or disrupt the chances for p eace.
The maintenance of a high level of friendship and co-operation in
Canadian-American relations is a vital, if not the m ost vital, component of
Canadian foreign policy. Not only is the United States our best custom er, but
she looks to Canada for support in all her undertakings in foreign policy. The
United States on its part is remarkably willing to be conciliatory in her deal
ings with Canada. This situation is considered excellent by many Canadians
who feel it gives to Canada a chance to temper American policy with the
Canadian attitude at certain tim e s. This is important for the whole Western
a llia n c e with w h ich C anada m u st e ith e r s in k o r s w im and w h ich i s le d by our

great neighbour. "And all Canadian foreign policy is subject to the over
riding need to maintain the Western alliance led by the United States."^-®
^M ichael Barkway, "All Right, What Is Our Foreign P olicy?" ,
Saturday N ight, (May 8, 1951), p . 8.
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Canada must be wary of the effect her recognition of Communist China may
have on the United States in view of the adamant position among most of its
populace and officials against such recognition.
Recognition must also be considered in the light of Commonwealth
relations. Policy-m akers must ask them selves if recognition will strengthen
harmony within the Commonwealth. The existing situation in which some
Commonwealth members recognize Communist China while others do not,
makes the decision even more complex.
Finally any decision on recognition must take into consideration the
effect that decision w ill have on Canada's self proclaimed role as one of the
leaders of the so-called Middle P ow ers. In direct connection with this the
reaction of the Afro-Asian nations must be gauged correctly in order to make
the proper decision regarding recognition. It is not over-emphasizing the
importance of the problem of recognition of Communist China to call it a
major foreign policy decision.
To achieve its purpose this thesis must investigate the problem of
recognition of Communist China in the light of conditions at home and abroad
in the 1949-60 period.
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THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM
No Canadian government or opposition party could frame a policy on
recognition of Red China without regard to the relationship such a policy
would bear to the general picture of world conditions. If the decision were to
be based on legal considerations then one could agree that the proper course
of action would have to be followed without taking note of the strategic im pli
cations of the m ove. However, when the problem is considered to be prima
rily political it must be admitted that any solution must take cognizance of
the effects the policy will have on the world situation in general or on specific
Canadian foreign or domestic in terests. For this reason it is felt that a d es
cription of the salient factors on the Canadian foreign and domestic political
scen es from 1949 to 1960 is necessary to enable the reader to gain a better
perspective of what is involved in the recognition of Red China. 1.

General P olitical Conditions 1949

The Central Government of the People's Republic of China was pro
claim ed in Peking on October 1, 1949. This government invited recognition
on the basis of equality, friendship, respect for territorial integrity and with
drawal of recognition from the Nationalist government. Thus the question of
whether to recognize the new government was fir st posed to the Liberal admini
stration then in power in Canada.
It could be seen immediately that this matter would be more than just
13
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one of a routine extension of recognition. It would be considered as a move in
the cold war and as such could not be taken lightly. Thus the effect that recog
nition of Red China would have on the Western position via -a -v is the Commu
n ists came to be a major determinant of the policy of all Canadian political
parties although it will be seen later that the possible effects were interpreted
differently.
Communism had been checked in Europe by the creation of N .A .T .O .
However, events in Europe were still of prime importance as the emphasis on
A sia had not taken on the urgency so evident in later y e a r s. Chinese communism
was not looked upon as the same as that of Eastern Europe which had been in sti
tuted by force of Russian a rm s. Indeed, some C .C .F . m em bers1 believed
that the revolution in China was in large measure the result of agrarian discon
tent. This in itself prompted many of them to support recognition. Again in A sia, the Communist guerilla fighters in the Phillipines and Malaya were being
dealt with satisfactorily although they still constituted a threat especially in the
latter country.

The importance of China as a base of Communist operations

was realized but China was not considered strong enough at the time to pose a
real threat to the configuration of states- in South East A sia. However the evalu
ation of the Chinese danger to South East Asia soon changed especially because
of her aid to the Viet Minh forces of North Viet-Nam in the French Indo-China
conflict.
V ic to r y in C hina w a s c e r ta in ly the m o st im p ortan t s te p fo rw a rd fo r th e

Communists in A sia. The question Canadian policy makers had to decide with
regard to recognizing Red China was whether recognition would augment that
^ e e the statement of Mr. Stewart on p . 58.
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victory or non-recognition might somehow detract from it . It could also be
conjectured that recognition might help win over the Chinese from the
Communist camp while non-recognition would further alienate them from the
W est. It can be seen that the situation left many avenues for speculation and
m ost have been explored at one time or another.
By early 1950, Britain and India had recognized Red China. Thus
two countries with which Canada has very close ties had taken the step which
Canada was only contemplating. The Canadian populace included many tradi
tionalists who still clung to the view that Britain’s foreign policy should form
the criterion that Canada must follow in external affairs. Was this to be so
with regard to recognition of Communist China? In the case of India one
witnessed the leading country of free A sia recognizing Peking. Both Britain
and India were Commonwealth partners of Canada and this tended to compound
the dilemma.
The advantage of presenting a common Commonwealth front in foreign
affairs was realized by the Canadian government. On the other hand Canada,
like her sister Commonwealth states, had her own special problems and could
not automatically follow the Commonwealth lead. M r. Pearson, the Canadian
Secretary of State for External A ffairs, attended a Commonwealth Conference
of Foreign M inisters at Columbo, Ceylon in January, 1950. This afforded
him the opportunity of learning first hand the positions of countries which had
recognized Red China. By that time four Commonwealth m em bers, Britain,
Ceylon, India and Pakistan, had accorded recognition to the Peking regim e.
Canada’s position of membership in both N .A .T .O . and the Common
wealth presented problems. On one hand she could not afford to do anything
to enhance Communism but on the other she wished to be in a position of
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leadership among the so-called Middle Powers of which India, Pakistan and
Ceylon were important exam ples. Thus the position of Asian Commonwealth
m embers on recognition must have seem ed enticing as a means to gain
broader popularity for Canada in that area.
In contrast the position of the United States provided a restraint on
recognition of Peking by Canada. President Truman had announced that the
United States would not aid in the defence of Form osa. This touched off a
furious debate in the United States where the loudest outcry came from the
Republicans led by Senator Knowland and General Douglad MacArthur who
argued that defence considerations demanded the maintenance of Formosa as
a base for the containment of Communism and protection of the W est. Defence
of Formosa naturally precluded recognition of the Peking regim e which
claim ed that island.

O

Canada was then caught in a position where she had to choose sides
between her two clo sest a llie s.
Ottawa would have to decide whether to move forward in accepting
what appeared to London to be the facts and n ecessities of the
ca se, or to refuse recognition on the divergent reading of
Washington. ^
It is little wonder that M r. Pearson called for a cautious policy. China was a
testing ground for Communism in Asia and conditions in that part of the world
could change rapidly.
In Canada itself the question of recognition of Communist China seem ed
almost academ ic. Diplomatic recognition is accorded so that contact is avail
able to transact business, com m ercial or otherwise. "But this was not an
^W .E .C . Harrison, Canada in World A ffairs, 1949-50, (Toronto:
Oxford U niversity P r e ss , 1957), pp.245-246.
3H arrison, p . 167.
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urgent reason for there was not much business to transact and the friendly
4
serv ices of other Commonwealth countries were available.'* Thus, Canada
did not have to consider recognition as an expedient for protecting com mercial
interests as Britain had been forced to do. At that time Canada was in a
period of great prosperity and trade was booming. While few would discount
the advantage of gaining Chinese m arkets, Canada was well enough off for
large numbers of people to say that we should not sacrifice principles for trade.
On the other hand those calling for increased Chinese trade did not have an
urgent economic condition to underline their demands.
2.

Chinese Aggression and its Aftermath

With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 the problem
assum ed a new perspective. Red Chinese intervention in that war, in October
1950, showed conclusively that Peking did indeed pose a m ilitary threat in
China. The situation now called for a decision on recognizing a government
which was overly hostile to Canada. The immediate reaction was to make
recognition of the Peking regime im possible while the war was on. All parties
concurred in that b elief. Recognition at that time would have been particu
larly unpopular, both in the United States and Canada.
At that tim e recognition of Red China was becoming more closely tied
to the question of which group would sit in the Chinese seat at the United
Nations. On September 19, 1950, the Indian delegation introduced a resolution
to seat Red China. It was argued in the United Nations that solutions to far
Eastern problems would be facilitated by the adoption of the resolution. It
^H .F . Angus, Canada and the Far East 1940-1953, (Toronto:
University of Toronto P r e ss, 1953), p .36.
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would be better to have diverse opinions stated from within the United Nations
rather than outside it. It was difficult for non-recognizing nations to acquiesce
with the North Koreans committing aggression concurrently. Canada abstained
from voting on the resolution and introduced her own resolution suggesting that
a special committee study the problem. Abstention on the Indian measure could
be interpreted to indicate that Canada had no active objection to seating Com
munist China. More likely Canada was loath to vote against an Indian resolu
tion on the grounds that such action might alienate India to some extent. For
Canada there could be no thought of Red Chinese entry into the United Nations
/

before the Korean situation was in some way ameliorated.
In June and July of 1951, truce talks in Korea were undertaken.
This heralded the cessation of hostilities and hopes for a peaceful denouement
to Far Eastern problems were engendered. Recognition of the Peking regime
came to be associated with the search for peace. The Red Chinese had been
branded aggressors and a suitable Korean settlement seem ed mandatory if
that stigma was to be lifted. Until such time as Red China had helped to solve
the problems she had caused, many felt recognition would be premature.
Formosa also came to be considered more urgently. It had been
neutralized by the presence of United States naval units in the Straits of Form osa.
Both Chinese governments claimed that Formosa was part of China. The Com
munists felt that recognition by another country must entail support of their
claim to Formosa if Peking was to reciprocate. This clearly could not be a
condition of Canadian recognition of the mainland government. The problem
then of finding an amicable settlement was extremely difficult and indeed is no
clo ser to a solution at present.
American opinion on recognition had been made even more unyielding
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by the Korean W ar. The faction led by Senator Knowland was outraged by even
the consideration of such a policy. A rift in Angle-American relations had
occurred because of the British recognition. The prospect of strained
Canadian-American relations was not a happy one and therefore Canadian
policy-m akers had to understand the American attitude.
As in Canada, many in the United States before the Korean War had
been favourably disposed towards recognizing the Peking regime as the lawful
government of China. Had the Korean War not occurred recognition might
have been extended and the Anglo-American cleavage would not have developed.
The effects of American recognition would have been far-reaching. Canada
and many other states would have followed the American lead. The Commun
ist regime would have had the right to represent China in international organi
zations and would have had claim to all Chinese public property, bank
balances, ships, planes etc. that were held by the Nationalist government.
The Nationalist government of course would have no longer been recognized as
the government of China and Formosa would have come under Chinese autho
rity as agreed at Cairo in 1943. Peking would have replaced the Nationalist
Chinese on the Security Council at the United Nations.
Red China’s aggression in Korea, however, ended such speculation
and hardened American opinion against recognition. By 1953-54 the United
States was committed to use the veto in the Security Council against Red China’s
bid to enter. If Red China was accepted into the United Nations, Senator
Knowland of the United States had vowed to introduce a resolution in the Senate
to withdraw the United States from the United Nations. What merit was there
in the American attitude? It was true that no doubt existed as to who controlled
the mainland but it had been proven that Peking had not shown any willingness
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to act as a responsible world citizen. The British experience provided proof
that recognition had not achieved any useful diplomatic resu lts. By her failure
to be a good world citizen, Red China provided the United States with some
legal footing on which to base her purely political view of recognition. Recog
nition might still have come when the world situation became le s s tense and
the new government began to show signs of accepting the international statusquo, with its accompanying obligations, as the case had been with the Soviet
Union. The need for negotiations had led to a quasi-recognition already, as
evidenced by the Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw in 1955.
S till the question had not been answered as to what the United States would do if a Korean settlement was concluded.
The French failure to repulse the Communists in Indo-China ended
with the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954, and set the stage for
the Geneva Conference of 1954. At these discussions Red China came to con
front the Western Powers who had been forced to deal with her. To many,
( e .g . C .C .F . in Canada), this implied a tacit admission of recognition. At
i

any rate the situation had been reached where there was no alternative but to
enter into discussions with the Peking regim e.
It was hoped that at Geneva the groundwork would be laid for the
future eradication of tension in the Far E ast. This atmosphere of hope may
have well given rise to a feeling that perhaps recognition might provide yet
another step to establish a lasting p eace. The C .C .F . certainly felt that recog
nition would aid discussions with Red China.
After Geneva and moving into the later years of the 1950's the pockets
of tension in the world shifted to the Middle East and Africa. This led to a
lessening of the immediate urgency of recognition of Red China by Canada.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

21

3. Economic Problems and Their Effect on the Question
Between the Conservative election victory of June 1957 and 1960
there was a decline in the tempo of Canadian economic growth with the result
ant effects on employment and general properity. In such circum stances the
necessity of expanding trade to further economic recovery became more
p r e s sin g .4 The huge market potential of China was indeed inviting for Canadian
exporters. Thus the claim that recognition would lead to greater SinoCanadian trade took on added significance.
Points of serious friction in Asia which had existed a few years pre
viously were far le s s volatile in the late 1950's, and the argument of the need
for recognition to facilitate negotiations lost much of its former urgency. In
these circumstances the problem could settle into a discussion of what was to
be gained or lost by recognition, based generally on pragmatic grounds. Trade
and the possibilities of furthering it thus came out as a very important element
in the discussion.

■

*

With the shift in the area of greatest world tension away from the Far
Eastern area tem porarily, Canada's relationship with China could be con
sidered with a le s s emotional approach. A purely economic approach seemed
a wise one to some elements especially in British Columbia which stood to
benefit most by trade. In any event the call for increased trade with Red
China certainly would find a better reception in a period of unemployment and
recession than it would have in previous years of record prosperity.
In addition to this the period after the Conservative victory of 1957
showed some tendency to a greater nationalist feeling. This feeling reacted
against the purported American domination of Canadian foreign policy. The
position of Canada with regard to Red China was considered a prime example
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of this supposed American interference. Recognition then could be accorded
and thus Canadian independence in foreign policy would have been asserted.
Perhaps the feeling of nationalism could also in part be attributed to economic
d istress as there may have been a tendency to blame the United States for
essentially Canadian problem s.
The shift in emphasis in foreign affairs, however, lessened the im 
portance of recognition as a factor in total Canadian foreign p olicy. Trade
could then assum e a greater importance since arguments which claimed that
dealing with Red China represented an abdication of principles carries le s s
weight when no current situations were coming to a head in the Far E ast. In
general, under the Conservative administration the problem of recognition
never assumed the importance it som etim es attained in previous y e a r s.
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THE LIBERAL POSITION
1.

The Liberals in Power

From the inception of Communist China to June of 1957 the Liberal
party formed the government of Canada. L ester B . Pearson carried the
external affairs portfolio in that administration. He was therefore the man
responsible for the policy of non-recognition of Red China which was main
tained during that period. His considerations of the question as they can be
interpreted from public statements he made, clearly show that Pearson viewed
the issue as a political rather than a legal m atter.
In the first statement on this issue that Pearson made to the House of
Commons (on October 25, 1949), he stated that the government would view
recognition in the light of international law. The criteria for recognition
would be independence for foreign control, effective control over the territory
and a well defined territory. If these requirements were met consideration
should be given to recognition. * The implication was clear that should Red
China fulfill the demands of international law she would be entitled to consi
deration for recognition but not necessarily recognition itself. If recognition
were a legal problem then a situation in which a government conforms to inter
national law would surely lead directly to recognition. Since, however,
Pearson said that consideration of recognition would follow from fulfillment

Debates

■^Canada, Parliam ent, House of Commons, Official Report of
(Hereafter referred to as Debates). October 25, 1949, p. 1109.
23

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

24
of certain requirements it must be deduced that legal considerations are only
pre-requisites for a question of recognition to merit investigation. The final
disposition of the problem would depend on other factors which are political
in nature.
When the issue of recognition is placed in a political framework its
disposition becomes the result of subjective evaluations rather than an objec
tive judicial decision. Thus Pearson had to weigh carefully the possible ram i
fications of a verdict in either direction. It was clear that Canadians were
strong in their condemnation of communism but could this be used as an
excuse to ignore the controlling influence that the Peking regime had over
450 m illion Chinese? Pearson certainly did not want to adopt any stance
which could be construed as approving of communism. Thus he strongly
denied that recognition implied anything more than an acknowledgement of an
existing government.
if the fact of communist control of China is confirmed and an
independent - I stress the word 'independent' - Chinese govern
ment, able to discharge its international obligations is
established and accepted by the Chinese people, then in due
course and after consultation with other friendly governments,
we will have to recognize the facts which confront u s. If we
indicate in the future, recognition of the Chinese government,
that will not indicate any approval of communism in China
any more than our recognition of the communist states of
Eastern Europe indicates approval of their form of government.
It however should help maintain the contact between the Canadian
and Chinese peoples which I have mentioned.2
Government policy was non-committal as it assumed a wait-and-see
attitude. The lack of unanimity in policy among Canada's a llie s, the uncer
tainty of how conditions would turn out in the Far East and the absence of any
pressing business to pursue with China all led to a cautious approach to the
2Pebates. November 16, 1949, p. 1838.
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m atter. The government was caught between two directly opposed views on
recognition embodied in the Conservative and C .C .F . parties and their cautious
approach satisfied neither. The C .C .F . which advocated recognition chastised
the government for withholding it while the Conservatives on the other hand com
plained of indications that the Liberal government favoured recognition.
Pearson seemed more disposed, however, to defend the government
against Conservative remarks than against C .C .F . allegations. He reviewed
som e of the legal pre-requisites for recognition and asserted that de facto and
de jure recognition had to be distinguished. Recognition and diplomatic repre
sentation were not synonmyous he added. One had also to discern whether a
government's authority was being challenged or if it was in complete control.
Pearson argued that these conditions as described by international law were
never meant to be rigid and without exception. For instance a government’s
acceptance by the people is not necessarily evidenced by freely expressed
popular approval. R esistance of the people to the new government or support
of movements against the government can be termed indicative of approval by
the people. In this respect it seem s that Pearson might have been intimating
that the Communist victory over the Nationalists and the lack of any wide
spread revolt in China against the new regime implied that the majority of the
Chinese populace accepted the Peking government.^
To charges that recognition would endanger Viet-Nam , Pearson
answered that Britain, India and Pakistan had recognized Red China and no
evidence proved that their actions had caused the situation to deteriorate in
V iet-N am . He further stated that Soviet boycotting tactics in the United Nations
would not intimidate Canada into a decision favouring Peking.

However,

^D ebates, March 7, 1950, p .516.
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the situation in the United Nations which saw a growing number of member
states which recognized Red China posed a perplexing question,^ What would
Canada do if she were to find h erself in an organization in which a majority of
states had recognized Red China? If Red China were to sit in the same body
as Canada, Pearson felt it im possible to walk out in emulation of the Soviet
tactics but to remain and work with Peking's representatives would be a form
of recognition.
In early 1950 the government policy was still one of non-recognition
but not violently s o . It was a cautious appraisal of the situation and the posi
tion the government was in could shift either way. No definitive statements
had been made, the need to consult with allies and in general the importance
of making any decision, Canadians would regret was stressed .
At this point one might question the n ecessity of exercising caution
in the rendering to a government its legal right to be recognized or carrying
out the obligation to recognize. That the government of the day exercised
such caution indicated that it believed no such rights or obligations existed.
Caution was necessary due to the political implications of the problem.
The official government policy was non-recognition coupled with a
constant review of the case but within the Liberal party one could discern
support of recognition. H .A . Mackenzie (Lamton-Kent) was an outspoken ad
vocate of recognition. He had served with a U .N . relief organization in China
and could testify to the corruptness of the Nationalist government. The lack
of democracy in that country he felt had doomed the old system to d isaster.
In his opinion the Chinese were not particularly pro-Russian and thus there
^Debates, March 7, 1950, p .516.
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was no cause to suppose a permanent Sino-Soviet accord. Canada thus would
be best served by recognizing Red China in order to prevent her from being
driven into the arms of Soviet R ussia.

5

The Korean War ended the possibility of recognition for the time
being. "There can be no question even of considering it while the Chinese
defy the United Nations in Korea and fights our forces there."

6

Even before

the Chinese Communists actively entered the war it seem ed evident that they
approved and supported the North Korean aggression. Under these conditions
the arguments against recognition seem ed to carry more weight. For instance
it could be seen that Britain had received little as a result of recognition.
Peking had not even deigned to exchange envoys.
Pearson admitted that recognition of Red China would help in reach
ing solutions to Far-Eastern problems but added that this was incompatible
with the Chinese position in Korea:
'

I feel however that the Far Eastern problems could be more
easily solved if diplomatic relations existed with the government
of China which has the whole of the mainland under its control.
But the Peking government can hardly expect recognition now
from those member states of the United Nations whom they are
fighting in K orea. The remedy for the situation now lies with
the communists th em selves. They should not think they can
bludgeon or blackmail their way into recognition or into the
United Nations. 7
Again it was the pressure of political events that prevented Canadian

recognition. The legal considerations had not been altered by the Korean con
flict yet recognition which could be considered before the war was thought to
^Debates, pp. 1875-79.
6

L .B . Pearson, statement of May 7, 1951 quoted from External
A ffairs, June 1951, p .203.
7
Debates, February 2 , 1951, p . 55.
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be an im possible policy during the war. This is still further proof that the
legal factors in the issue were of secondary importance to the over-riding
political circum stances.
The ap p aren t lo g ic o f m any a r g u m en ts in favou r o f r e c o g n itio n w e r e
offset by the predictability of certain adverse results which would arise from
recognition. Thus while one side was saying it was absurd to regard Chiang
K ai-shek as the spokesman for the Chinese people the other side maintained
that it was not in Canada's best interests to strain relations with the United
States (a certain result of recognition) even if recognition did seem the w isest
course to follow. In the light of this it is not hard to understand the ambiva
lent attitude exhibited by the government. Its policy was non-recognition but
Pearson often seemed to favour the opposite approach.
What was needed the government maintained was an attitude of open
m indedness. A rigid outlook would not be correct, and to say that recognition
should never be accorded was folly. Pearson's experience in the field of
diplomacy had taught him that bargaining could not be successful if either side
begins negotiations with an inflexible attitude. This caused him to reject the
idea set forth by M r. Green (Vancouver-Quadra), a Conservative foreign
affairs c r itic , that the West make it clear that Formosa could never be handed
over to the Red Chinese. No avenue of discussion regarding Formosa or any
other aspect of the recognition problem should be closed off.
Among the supporters of recognition both within and without the admini
stration there was a feeling that no matter what situation existed on the main
land there was little support for the Nationalist regim e. Any move to re-instate
Chiang K ai-shek on the mainland would do great harm to Western prestige in
A sia . It was also agreed that it was through the Nationalists' own failings,
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rather than any lack of support from or betrayal by the United S tates, that the
Communists achieved their victory on mainland China. Western intervention
in China was looked on as a dangerous policy because in Mackenzie's words;
by associating counter-revolution, which can develop indigenously,
as the whole history of China show s, with foreign intervention and
foreign assistance we may strengthen rather than weaken communist
r e g im e s.8
A consideration that had to be borne in mind by the government was
that Canada's decision with regard to Red China was of little consequence when
considered in isolation. It was only when the Canadian decision on recognition
was looked upon as a political move of an important member of the Western
alliance that the significance of the matter could be fully appreciated. It was
in this context that the issue had to be deliberated.
Another possibility, that of exercising our influence on the United
States by taking the lead in recognizing Red China, found some support in
Canada.
Perhaps the most valuable Canadian contribution will be a point
of view, a healthy detachment, untrammelled by strong domestic
feeling or vital overseas territorial and economic in terests, a
detachment and candour that tries to balance political and legal
realities with the strategic requirements of the free world in
the Pacific and the need for some brake on aggressive Chinese
Communism in A s ia .9
Such a position was probably quite sim ilar to the views of Pearson.
The Liberal position of maintaining non-recognition as a policy but at
th e s a m e tim e a d m ittin g that it m igh t aid w o r ld p e a c e c a u se d th e m to b e th e

target of both Conservatives and the C .C . F . The former charged that the
8P ebates, January 29, 1954, p . 1590.
9Maxwell Cohen, "Communist China - To recognize or not to recognize"
International Journal, VIII (Autumn, 1953), 271.
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government was about to embark on a dangerous and detrimental policy while
the latter complained that the administration had admitted the value of recog
nition but did not have the courage to carry out that policy. Statements by the
government did little to calm the storm .
A prime example of the government's stand can be seen from state
ments made by Prim e Minister S t. Laurent during and after his world tour of
1954. It was alleged that he had said that the Chinese people accepted the
Communist govern m en t.^ There was an uproar over that comment and the
Prim e M inister apologized for making the wrong choice of words and giving
that im pression. However, he added that Western countries would sooner or
later have to recognize and deal with the effective government of China. Such
recognition would not necessarily be diplomatic in nature but might be a
change from the attitude of ignoring Communist China. The results of the
Geneva Conference and the views of Canada's allies would have to be weighed
but a position that recognition would never be extended could not be taken.
Communist Chinese presence at Geneva did not indicate recognition but only a
cognizance of the power controlling the mainland. As long as the Peking
regime controlled China that group had to be included in vital d iscussions.
Even though he saw the necessity of negotiating with the Red Chinese
the Prim e Minister asserted that: "under present conditions I do not see any
reason why we should consider diplomatic recognition of China."11 Dislike
of a government, however, could not be a permanent roadblock against recog
nition . An open mind had to be kept in regard to future contingencies. Thus
the government and its Liberal supporters felt it was folly to compare talking
10"About Recognizing China", editorial, Ottawa Journal, March 12,1954.
11Debates , March 25, 1954, p .3334.
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with the Chinese Communists at Geneva to the flight of Chamberlain to Munich
as had been done by the C onservatives.

12

"Legal recognition is something you give for your own national advan
tage in your own national in terests, which includes as the most important objective of all, maintaining and strengthening the peace."

13

That statement by

Pearson leaves no doubt that he considered the problem a purely political one.
An implication that can be derived from that statement as w ell, is that recog
nition would be a good policy even if it benefited the Communists as long as it
benefited Canada to a greater degree. Pearson was seemingly moving closer
to recognition while denying that such a move was imminent. His statements
indicated that any movement toward resolving Far Eastern problems would
cause a reconsideration of the Canadian position.
It became more evident that Pearson would have liked to discover a
way to extend recognition to China. In various speeches14 he repeated that,
should Red China show a spirit of cooperation, Canada should consider recog
nition .
Certainly the absence from negotiations and discussions at the
United Nations or elsewhere of the de facto power on the Chinese
mainland makes im possible, without the consent of the regim e,
the effective settlement of disputed matters around that country's
periphery: K orea, Formosa or Indo-China.15
The major drawback of course was finding a way to recognize Peking without
^ Debates, March 26, 1954, p .3386.
-^D ebates, March 30, 1954, p .3544.
14e .g . In the second of his Stafford Little Lectures at Princeton
University in April 1955; in a speech to the Women’s Canadian Club of Vancouver
in August 1955.
15L .B . Pearson quoted by D.C . M asters, Canada in World Affairs
1953-55, (Toronto: Oxford University P r e ss , 1959), p . 113.
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precipitating a major rift with the United S tates.
To avoid friction with one's closest ally was a concept readily under
stood by Pearson. Thus it was a matter of prudence rather than subservience
which caused Canada to defer to the United States on this issu e. Editorial com
ment, however, was more prone to take note of the purported barrier to
Canadian independence of action.

1 fi

Perhaps it was this type of pressure plus

his own predilections which prompted Pearson to sound out American opinion.
In the Stafford Little lectures referred to above (p. 40) he made a
first effort at convincing the Americans that recognition after all was not such
a bad idea. More specifically he wrote in an article in Look magazine that
the West could negotiate with Peking when necessary without approving of the
regim e or weakening our position against communism. At that time he was
trying to im press Dulles and Eisenhower with the logic of recognition. How
ever an election year in the United States (1956) was not an apt one to ask an
American administration to make such a controversial decision. Thus Canada
was informed quite strongly at the White Sulphur Springs conference in April
1956 that recognition was out of the question. Pearson later admitted that the
issu e was not worth causing a first cla ss row with the United States.

18

A domestic situation of some political significance also had an
■^Blair F razer, "Will we play me too China?" Macleans (October 24,
1955), p .6.
Kenneth McNaught, "Parliamentary Control of Foreign Policy?"
International Journal, (Autumn, 1956), p .259.
17

L .B . Pearson, "Some Blunt Words from a Good Neighbour" Look
(January 10, 1956), p p .62-63.
*®A tape recorded interview of L .B . Pearson by B . Frazer and
L . Shapiro. M acleans, (July 6, 1957), p .52.
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important bearing on the deliberations concerning recognition.
The recognition of Communist China, for example, was strongly
distasteful to most French-speaking Canadians who exhibited on
this issu e a more solidly united opinion than was evident elsewhere
in the nation. 19
It was quite possible that Pearson could not have won a Cabinet argument over
recognition because of opposition from Quebec. In their opposition to recog
nition, the French-Canadians were joined by Eastern-European immigrants
and others who found special cause for grievances against the Communists.
That Pearson went ahead and intimated support of recognition may indicate
that he felt capable of coping with these domestic political factors.
From all available evidence, one would have to conclude that it was
the position of the United States that influenced Canada not to accord recogni
tion. This could by no means be considered a legal consideration but was of
course purely political. Coupled with this was the amount of opposition in
Canada to recognition and the political strength of that opposition. That the
government did not accord recognition despite its own feelings about the m erits
of such a policy and the pressure from many quarters in favour of recognition,
indicates that the problem was not considered important enough to risk tension
with the United States or political repercussions in Canada. There were no
impelling reasons to accord recognition. Hopes for trade were not strong nor
were the needs for diplomatic contact important, as they were provided by
our Commonwealth partners. No obstacles prevented Canadians from travel
ling in China and thus many journalists and businessmen did s o . Even the
M inister of F ish eries, M r. Jam es Sinclair, visited China without upsetting
^ J a m es E ayrs, Canada in World Affairs October 1955 to June 1957,
(Toronto: Oxford University P r e ss, 1959), p. 15.
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the policy of non-recognition. In short the responsible policy-m akers of the
tim e did not feel it politically advantageous to accord recognition to the Peking
regime at that tim e and therefore recognition was not accorded.
2.

The Liberal Position as an Opposition Party

The Liberal party, and especially its leader, Mr. Pearson, who had
framed the foreign policy of the previous administration, found them selves in
an uncomfortable situation as the Opposition. Their position had been that
recognition was a good idea but not important enough to create a rift with the
United States . Now that they were out of power it might have been expected
that their views could be a little less restricted since they would not be trans
lated into official policy. The drawback was that if they had advocated recog
nition they would have been faced with the question of why they had not
accorded it in the period 1949-1957. Still without being so bold as to say it
openly, M r. Pearson certainly gave the im pression of favouring early re
cognition. He asked how long we could support United States position that
United Nations membership for Red China should not even be discussed.
Besides that, could we really expect Peking to accept disarmament with con
trol and inspection while still not recognized diplomatically by many nations
within the U .N . ? The argument that we would be abandoning Asia to commun
ism lost its force when it was seen that most Asian countries recognized
Peking. Recognition would have been pointless and worse than u seless if we
did not support the Red Chinese claim for a United Nations sea t. It was the
ambiguous position of the United Kingdom in this respect which had cost her
any chance of benefiting for the recognition she had extended. Recognition
might not increase trade as much as many expected but Canada could not
expect trade to expand as much without recognition.
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Out of his appraisal of the situation, Mr. Pearson came up with the
following suggestions. A trade m ission should be sent to China to explore the
p ossib ilities of sa le s. Recognition or not, Formosa should not be handed over
. to China before the people of Formosa had a chance at self-determ ination.
This was not the same as a "Two China" policy since that was unacceptable to
both Chinese governments but Canada could not hand over the Formosans to
Peking against their w ill. The United States should be persuaded to have the
Nationalists evacuate the offshore islands. The maintenance of large numbers
of troops on these islands seemed to constitute a threat to the mainland and to
remove that threat would quiet the situation in the Formosan stra its. L astly,
he said that we should work out a common policy with other non-recognizing
countries. A tim e for decision might be drawing close and we should have
worked towards a better position for making our choice.

90

In summing up the Liberal record on the subject of recognition of
Communist China, one cannot fail to notice that political considerations were
all important in framing policy. Legal arguments were only pre-requisites for
making the problem worthy of attention. That is , certain legal requirements
had to be attained before the political criteria for recognition would be applied
to the issue . M r. Pearson as chief foreign policymaker of the Liberal regime
was cognizant of the fact that it was not the legal rights of China nor the legal
duties of Canada that were involved in this issu e but rather the national se lfinterest of Canada which was preponderant.
2°Debates, February 26, 1959, p p .1413-1415.
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IV
THE CONSERVATIVE OUTLOOK
From 1949 to 1957, the Conservative party formed the official oppo
sition . In June of 1957 the federal elections brought them into power which
they maintained for the duration of the period under consideration in this
p ap er. To discover the motives which led to the Conservative policy on r e 
cognition of Communist China will be the purpose of this chapter. A study of
these motives and the policy which they generated will show that political
factors most influenced the Conservatives in framing a stand on the question
of recognition.
The Social Credit viewpoint is also included in this chapter. This
party had an outlook which was sim ilar to the Conservatives in many ways.
It w ill be seen that the Social Credit party also based its views about recog
nition on political argum ents.
1.

The Conservatives in Opposition

From the very outset the Conservative party opposed the recognition
of Red China. Basic to this policy was the view that Canada could in no way
countenance the ideology of the Peking regim e. Following from this it was
evident that no move should be undertaken that would in any way enhance the
spread of communism. Recognition, the Conservatives felt, would aid the
Chinese Communist in spreading their influence in A sia.
Due to the non-committal policy of the government the Conservatives
(who were the official opposition party) seemed in no hurry to make definitive
36
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statements in the months immediately following the creation of Red China.
They were waiting in hopes of finding an issue on which to pillory the govern
ment. Accordingly, Mr. Flemming questioned Pearson, in the Committee on
External A ffairs, as to whether Parliament would be consulted before a deci
sion was made
George Drew, leader of the official opposition, tried at first to prove
that under the principles of international law, Red China was not entitled to
recognition. He leaned heavily on quotations from Lauterpacht to lend credence
to this view but showed no inclination to follow Lauterpacht's theories com
pletely. It was argued that consent of the population of the state to the govern
ment seeking recognition must be present to warrant such action. Spain,
which was kept out of the United Nations because Franco was not representa
tive of the people, was cited as an example. Furthermore, he considered that
the action of the United Nations in that case had become part of international
law.

'
Having made this attempt at marshalling legal arguments in defence

of a policy of non-recognition, Drew moved to safer ground by outlining the
political drawbacks of recognition.
This is not only a question of the formality of recognition; this
is not only a question of what recognition means to u s . It is a
question of what recognition means to the Chinese, to the
R ussians, and to those countries in South-East Asia which are
still doing all they can to hold the vile flood of communism
from their countries .2
Recognition he felt would jeopardize the freedom of the countries of South-East
•^Canada, Parliam ent, House of Commons, Minutes, Proceedings and
Evidence of the Standing Committee on External A ffairs, November 18, 1949,
p p .24-25.
2P ebates, March 3 , 1950, p . 462.
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A sia. Therefore Soviet blackmailing tactics at the United Nations in favour of
Red China had to be resisted rather than appeased. Recognition, in Drew's
opinion should not precede the working out of a common W estern strategy con
cerning Red China.
During the Korean War the Conservative Party could relax in its
efforts to prevent recognition of the Peking regime since the government had
avowed that no recognition would come while the Red Chinese were engaged in
combat with Canadians. However, the policy of non-recognition was still
actively supported.

W .J. Browne (St. John's West) was especially demon

strative in his speeches against any move towards recognition. He described
Red China as a tyranny and warned that we should not offer her any aid in en
larging their control. This he felt would have been an effect of recognition.
Browne voiced opinions that frightened calm er heads, in that he appeared to
be advocating the widening of the Korean conflict into mainland China. Once
again it must be pointed out that Browne was not in all probability voicing the
policy of the Conservative party. Although his views generally coincided with
the party attitude, he seemed to be more radical in his outlook.

Q

The position of Canadians in China gave the anti-recognition groups
ammunition in their struggle to prevent recognition. As of March 10, 1951,
one hundred and sixty Canadians were still in China. A few hundred had left
the country prior to that date. Certain Canadians had been subjected to arbi
trary arrest and had been held incommunicado. The most celebrated case was
that of the five nuns who had been arrested on trumped up charges and were
tried publicly in Canton on December 2, 1951.^ This of course outraged the
3Debates, May 14, 1951, pp. 2980-83.
4

D ebates, April 21, 1952, p. 1423.
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Catholic elem ents in Canada and made Quebec, which was against recognition
from the beginning, even more hostile to the Red Chinese regim e.

Public

opinion in Canada at this time was strongly against recognition. Canadians
were more disposed to consider that they had troops fighting in Korea than to
consider legal or diplomatic questions.®

"No government in Peking commit

ting aggression can hope to be taken into the community of nations."® In stat
ing this Drew made clear his view that recognition, rather than being a pre
condition for negotiations, could be accorded after Red China had curbed her
aggressive tendencies and aided in the discovery of ways to end tension in the
Far E ast. No solution, however, was conceivable to the Conservatives which
would give Formosa to the Red Chinese. Legal considerations supporting
Communist claim s notwithstanding, the freedom of Formosans could not be
sacrificed nor could the Pacific defensive network be altered in such a manner.
The Conservative policy then was based on a firm belief that the Com
munist Chinese would have to repudiate their aggressive tendencies before they
could be considered worthy of recognition. At the same tim e, however, Canada
could not m erely take Peking's word that Red China was ready to reform . A
Pacific defensive network was n ecessary for the security of Canada and the
W est and in line with this necessity Form osa could never fall into the hands of
the mainland government. Unless one were prepared to argue that Canada had
a legal right to a Pacific defensive network if it was to accord recognition to
Red China, we must discern that the Conservative policy was based on what
were considered to be the political realities of the situation.
5J3.S. K ierstead, Canada in World A ffairs, 1951-53 (Toronto: Oxford
University P r e s s , 1956), p .59.
^Debates, March 10, 1952, p .247.
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In addition if legality were to be considered then the m erit of the Red
Chinese claim to Formosa would at least have had to be considered. N ever
theless , Drew had pointed out the immorality of any action designed to place
the Formosan populace under communist control. In this view he was joined
by the Liberals and even the C .C .F . who favoured recognition. Morality in
international relations would be considered of course from the subjective view
of a national state. Thus it would be a political consideration .
For the Conservatives no arguments, whether based on legalism ,
realism or optimism, could override the morally influenced political attitude
that Red China's policies had vitiated any chance of recognition under the then
existing circum stances. A statement by John Diefenbaker (Prince Albert) who
later became Prim e M inister, typified this position.
Certainly recognition will be hard to justify, however much
it may appeal legalistic ally to students of international law,
so long as the people's government continues its programme
of virtual annexation of North Korea, supplying arms in Indo- China and apparently doing everything it can to spread com 
munism and disruption in other parts of A sia. While it is
impossible to say with finality that China should never be
recognized, a good case has not been made for recognition.'7
Again we can see that even if the legal validity of recognition was ad
m itted, (as it was tacitly in Diefenbaker's statement) in them selves they could
not be considered a primary reason to extend recognition as far as the Conser
vatives were concerned. It was one thing to recognize evil as existing but quite
another to garb it in the cloak of international respectability. Drew added this
strong m oralistic view; "I hope that in this house we will say that our moral
sense forbids us to accept Chou-En-lai, Mao-Tse-Tung or any of the communist

^D ebates, January 29, 1954, p p .1595-96.
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hierarchy who are murdering their countrymen in the name of China today.”8
Because of their opposition to recognition the Conservatives were quick to
attack Prim e Minister S t. Laurent's poor choice of words during his world tour
in 1954. 9 His words, they said, had made recognition seem inevitable and
Canada would soon have to support Peking's claim for China's United Nations
sea t. How, they asked, could we let Red China shoot her way into the United
Nations? There was no reason for recognition at that time as far as the Con
servatives were concerned and the future should be dealt with as conditions
a ro se. It was wrong, they felt, to give Red China hope that recognition would
come la ter. There was no use contemplating future contingencies and recog
nition should not even be considered. Diefenbaker summed up these views by
stating;
This is no time to give a fillip to Communism in Asia by
giving Communism to believe that aggression w ill, if not
rewarded, at least will be considered as worthy of recog
nition in the international world of the present.
Drew made it quite clear that he was disturbed by implications he
had gathered from speeches by Pearson.*'1' The opposition leader felt that
Pearson had implied that a conciliatory pose by Red China at Geneva might
prompt recognition. This type of thought was called appeasement by Drew.
He could place no faith in Communist promised and warned that any reliance
on Communist good faith would constitute a dangerous policy.

12

Any hope that China would be won away from Russia was ill founded
^D ebates, January 29, 1954, p . 1619.
g
See above p . 30.
Debates, March 25, 1954, p . 3340.
11

Speeches made by Pearson in Washington, Chicago and Windsor on
March 15,19 and 22, 1954 respectively.
■ ^ D e b a t e s , March 26, 1954, p . 3373.
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in Drew's opinion. Recognition would only aid communism and indeed com
munist parties throughout the world had been told to aid in achieving i t .
Neither would trade be benefited by recognition according to the Conservative
viewpoint. Trade with Russia had proven to Canada's disadvantage and there
was no reason to believe it would be otherwise with China. The Conservatives
contended that Britain had gained nothing in the way of trade by recognizing
Peking. In any event they felt that we should not sell our principles for trade.
Finally recognition would be interpreted by peoples behind the Iron Curtain
as an abandonment of their ca u se.

l O

Arguments against recognition which were most often put forward by
the Conservatives in opposition asserted that recognition would be wrong since
it would aid the communists while Canada would gain little . Legal considera
tions faded into the background after Drew's early attempt at formulating a
legal case against a policy of recognition. Only the political questions raised
had any significance and behind these problems lay the tremendous differ
ences in political ideology between Communist China and Canada. It must be
concluded that opinions based on ideological factors in the final analysis
determined the Conservative outlook on recognition.
2.

The Conservative Party in Power

The last period under discussion in conjunction with Conservative
p o lic ie s s ta r te d w ith t h e ir e le c tio n v ic to r y in June of 1957 and e x te n d s u n til

the end of 1960. What differentiates this period from the prior one is not so
much a change in policy but a change in policymakers and to some extent a
-^Debates. March 26, 1954, p .3374.
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change in the factors which influence policy. The party now in power was the
one which for eight years had been supporting non-recognition. It was not
likely they would change their stand. It was also a party which had used an
appeal to Canadian nationalism as a weapon in its election fight and as such
the official policy became one of non-recognition because of national se lfinterest and not non-recognition in deference to American opinion.
The difficulty of Canada's position because of the United States policy
was not ignored but rather ways of getting around it were explored. "In the
face of the depth of American opinion on this issu e, Canadian policy could not
have a truly independent ch a ra cter." ^ But M r. Diefenbaker was not sa tis
fied to just follow the United States, he tried to se ll wheat and refused to
become involved in the offshore islands dispute.
In late 1957 an official visit to mainland China by a Canadian trade
official was undertaken. Of this Prim e Minister Diefenbaker said; "There is
nothing inconsistent about endeavouring to trade and at the same tim e not
recognizing the government of that country." 15 He also re-iterated that the
position of his government would not change until Red China had expiated her
s in s . "Recognition under international law in the past used to be a juridical
1

act"

/*

but was not a political act which would be understood by Asian coun

tr ie s as a recognition of communism and would consequently weaken Asian
resistance to the communist m enace.
Thus the Prim e Minister was faced with the dilemma of agreeing with
14M. Cohen, "A China Policy for Canada," Saturday Night, III,
(October 11, 1958), 49.
-^D ebatest November 1, 1957, p .654.
1^Debates, November 1, 1957, p .654.
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the United States policy of non-recognition but not wanting to appear to be
m erely following the United States lead. Had the problem been a legal one
there could have been no criticism of following an American viewpoint if that
attitude had legal m erit. Since, however, the problem was political,criticism
was directed at the Conservative government for supporting the American
stand.
On February 26, 1958, Sidney Smith, the new Minister for External
A ffairs, made a definitive statement of the official government attitude
towards recognition of Communist China. He said the legal factors which
applied in any case of recognition had to be separated from the national and
international considerations . Legality deals with control over territory and
stability of a regime as w ell as its willingness to comply with duties assumed
by its predecessor in international affairs. Smith admitted there was little
doubt that Peking commanded the obedience of the bulk of the Chinese popula
tion. As for their willingness to adhere to international law, the Commun
is ts had declared they would not be bound by any agreements entered into by
their Nationalist p red ecessors. Yet Peking had done as much in fulfilling
its obligations as many other governments ( e .g . other Communist countries)
then recognized. "It must be admitted, therefore, that most of the legal
requirements for recognition have been fulfilled by the government of the
People's Republic." 17 The attainment of legal requirem ents, however, did
not lead automatically to recognition.
A decision had to be based on furthering Canada's national in ter ests.
Trade in his opinion was not a pressing argument for recognition. There was
17P ebates. February 26, 1959, p .1405.
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no proof that recognition would lead to an increase in trade. Red China was
not above using trade as a political weapon as had been shown in her relations
with Japan, Malaya and Singapore
The views of Howard Green, after he became Minister of External
Affairs should be noted. This is not to say that these views were any dif
ferent than the previous official p olicy. "The Canadian government does not
believe that Red China should be recognized under present conditions."1^
The adherence to the old policy had to continue to make sure we do not let our
Asian friends down. Recognition could only complicate matters for Canada in
view of the following statement by C hou-en-lai.
Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. We are deter
mined to liberate Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy and Matsu. All U .S .
armed forces in the Taiwan area must be withdrawn. The Chinese
people absolutely w ill not tolerate any plot to carve up Chinese
territory and create two Chinas. In accordance with this principle
any country that d esires to establish diplomatic relations with our
country must sever so called diplomatic relations with the ChianK ai-shek clique and respect our country’s legitimate rights in
- international a ffa irs.20
/
Green felt that there was no reason to accord recognition.
Even if the United States were to accord recognition, it did not follow
that Canada would. If Canada saw no advantage in recognition what would be
the sense of giving it. Canadian supporters of recognition were a bit over
bearing, in Mr. Green's opinion, because they felt the Canadian policy was

^^ D e b a te s , F e b r u a r y 2 6 , 1 9 5 9 , p . 1 4 0 5 .

-^ D eb ates, February 10, 1960, p .938.
20Chou-en-lai as quoted by Green, Debates, February 10, 1960,
p . 938.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

46
just a reflection of the American point of view . 21
The conclusions to be drawn from this period are the same as in the
preceding periods. Recognition will be accorded on the basis of its political
advantage to Canada not because of any legal requirements which have been
m et. It was admitted that certain legal requirements existed and that Red
China had fulfilled them but this did not lead to recognition.
The chief political reason for non-recognition between 1957 and 1960 '
was the attitude of the party in power which abjured recognition. The reasons
for this attitude have been given. Trade obviously was not considered an im 
portant enough motive to extend recognition since it did grow without it. Our
seeming subservience to American policy in foreign relations still rankled
many people. "The prevailing Canadian view was that the U .S . policy was
unrealistic, excessively ideological and dangerously em otive." 22 Yet the
government was not about to change its own policy m erely because it coincided
with the American policy. The Conservative attitude had been framed with a
regard to what it felt to be the salient political conditions and only a different
set of conditions could lead to a change in that policy.
4.

The Social Credit Attitude

Social Credit ideas on recognition of Red China w ere, like the other
political parties, prim arily political. These political ideas were based on a
strongly moral attitude against the Communist regime in China. Social
Creditors also seem ed generally to have a high respect for Chiang-Kai-shek
^ "E xternal Affairs M inister Green Answers Some Questions on
Canada^ Position," World A ffairs, (December, 1960), pp. 13-14.
92

Fred Alexander, Canadians and Foreign P olicy, (Toronto:
University of Toronto P r e ss , 1960), p . 129.
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and the views of Senator Knowland and the China Lobby

in the United States.

R ev. E.G.. Hansell, (McLeod) clergyman and Social Credit member,
espoused his objections to recognition of Peking in high moral platitudes.
Legality within the framework of international law lacked significance, his main
approach being resoundingly political. The degree to which his political views
were imm ersed in considerations of religious morality are illustrated by his
view that recognition should not be granted m erely to facilitate trade. This
would be selling out our p rinciples. He also added a condition of recognition
which was rem iniscent of the doctrine of the id ealist, President Woodrow
Wilson of the United States, by stating that a period of time should elapse
after a revolution in order that we may determine if the government to be
recognized is free and d em o cra tic.^
The attitude of the Social Credit party, a unique splinter party, was
openly aggressive. It in many ways mirrored the views of the China Lobby in
the United States. With regard to K orea, Solon Low, leader of the Social
Credit Party in the House, advocated marching right up to the Yalu R iver. He
said we should not be afraid of war with China as we took that risk when we
went to Korea in the first p lace. He deplored the blunders of the West in deal
ing with China and felt that we could have prevented China from falling to the
Communists. He intimated the Nationalist defeat was not Chiang-Kai-shekTs
fault. Low agreed that China should not be allowed to shoot her way into the
United Nations . However, Canada had to avoid showing unfriendliness to the
23A very powerful organization which promoted Chinese Nationalist
interest in the United States Congress. It was often termed one of the strong
e st lobbies ever to exert pressure on C ongress. Senator Knowland, Republican
leader of the Senate was its leader in C ongress.
OA

D ebates, November 16, 1949, pp. 1863-64.
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Chinese people and try to support their hopes for a better l if e . He opposed
Chiang-Kai-shek's return to the mainland at that tim e. The phrase "at that
time" indicates however, it might be a future course of action. The United
Nations should defend Formosa and prevent it from falling to Peking.
Among the Social Credit members there was a strong feeling that
recognition, rather than leading to peace, would provide an impetus for a
continued advance of communism in A sia . Hansell said that the Prim e Mini
ster had been influenced too much by M r. Nehru. In addition he charged that
the Department of External Affairs had for some tim e been looking at the
advantages of recognition. Furthermore, Nehru's policy, Hansell felt, was
looked upon favourably by St. Laurent and the Minister of External Affairs
during the Liberal administration. This policy was not concurred in by the
other Asian countries and he quoted United States Senator Knowland as his
authority on this m atter. It was the Social Credit contention that any policy
of appeasement to Red China (in the form of recognition) would have led to an
ultimate lo ss of freedom . Hansell made the foregoing comments by way of
introducing into the record of the House of Commons the resolution on recog
nizing Red China passed by the Alberta Social Credit convention in 1953.
Recognition would result in the loss of A sia and the enslavement of m illions
of people. Any hope of counter-revolution in China would be discouraged.
North America itself would be placed in danger. The Red Chinese record of
aggression and the probable results of recognition (as they saw them) elicited
on the part of the Convention an unalterable position against recognizing the
Peking regim e. Hansell's faith in the views of Senator Knowland was evidenced
^ D e b a te s,

March 21, 1952, pp.692-693.
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by his concluding comments in which he urged Canada leave the United
26
Nations should Red China enter.
If H ansell's views seem extreme they pale by comparison to the
opinions held by his fellow Social Credit member John H. Blackmore
(Lethbridge). If the China Lobby had had a Canadian branch this gentleman
would have undoubtedly been its leader. The first familiar refrain he brought
up was the argument that the revolution in China was not a genuine Chinese
movement but rather a product of Russian backing. The revolution had been
aided by the many C ommunists in the Truman administration who blocked aid
to Chiang-Kai-shek. These Communists later went to work for the United
Nations. The result of Canadian recognition would be that other countries
would construe it as a surrender to R u ssia. What other answer could be
arrived at if it is admitted that the Peking regime is not truly Chinese and that
recognition cannot possibly influence the Communists to cease aggression?
Canada would thus have given comfort to its enem ies and would have dismayed
its friends. Canadians would have consulates full of spies in their midst and
non-citizens of Chinese background in our country would pass under commun
ist control. The countries of Asia would have been told to make a deal with
Peking. The m ilitary question was also important as Formosa would make a
good base from which to attack China.

O '?

It seemed Blackmore was more pre

pared to go to war against Red China than recognize her.
The sampling of Social Credit thought seen above is representative of
the attitude of that party for the whole period from 1949 to 1960. Legal con
siderations were relegated to a minor role . Anti-communism and right wing
2 ^Debates, March 26, 1954, p .3395.
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IV

THE C .C . F . VIEWPOINT
Unlike the other political parties in Canada the C .C .F . was strongly
in favour of recognition of Red China throughout the period except when
active hostilities were going on in K orea. Basically they appealed for what
they felt was a realistic approach to the problem. Recognition was n eces
sary to help the cause of world p eace. Legal considerations were discussed
especially by M r. Coldwell, the party leader. However, the political con
siderations drastically affected the C .C .F . policy on recognition.
1.

Pre-Korean War Period

A listair Stewart (Winnipeg North) called for a realistic policy on
recognition. He pointed out that the Nationalist government did not deserve
Canadian support as they were a corrupt and autocratic group. It was further
stated by him that the Communist regime in China was not under Russian
domination. Recognition, he felt, was the correct policy from the Canadian
standpoint and such a policy would be beneficial if it were w ell-tim ed. It
should not be accorded at a moment when it would greatly enhance the p res
tige of the Peking regime but on the other hand it should be accorded before
it is too la te fo r C anada to b e n e fit fr o m the act. ^ This was another way of
saying recognition must serve Canadian political ends but not those of
Peking.
^Debates, November 17, 1949, p. 1874.
51
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M r. Coldwell, leader of the C .C .F . party, framed his argument with
emphasis on the legal aspect. His legal argument indeed seem ed to contro
vert the idea that recognition of a government is primarily a political act.
There are some who maintain that, all this notwithstanding, recog
nition is m erely a discretionary act of policy - an act of grace
which may be withheld at pleasure and may legitim ately be used as
a weapon of political intervention or of economic p ressure. There
is no support for any such view in the bulk of the practice of this
and other countries. On the contrary, overwhelming authority
points to the fact that provided the conditions presented by inter
national law are fulfilled, there is a legal duty to r e c o g n i z e . 2
Fortifying his belief in the justness of granting recognition to Peking, he
attempted to show how the Communists did indeed live up to the conditions of
recognition. He noted that the Nationalists had no chance of regaining control
of the mainland, that consent was no longer part of the law and that no assu r
ance was needed that obligations will be respected by the government to be
recognized.
Concerning Coldwell's remarks it should be first noted that he ad
hered to an argument which had only minority support (Lauterpacht) in the
field of international law as is shown in the introductory chapter of this paper.
Y et, minority opinion or not this argument remains a legal one in substance.
However, to call this a purely legal argument I feel we must be satisfied that
it is being put forward so that Canada will be in a legally correct position, the
political situation notwithstanding. Phrased in the interrogative this might
read: "Would Coldwell have advocated recognition on purely legal grounds if
that recognition were to be plainly detrimental to Canada?" If the answer
was in the affirmative then we must admit him to be a leg a list.
^Debates, March 7, 1950, p . 525.
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However, if the answer was in the negative we must draw the conclusion that
the legal arguments are put forward to further a political end. Thus basically
the argument would be political in nature with the legal aspect providing the
means to attain certain r e su lts. The record of Coldwell's statements and
those of members of his party sufficiently prove, I believe, that Coldwell and
the C .C . F . were more concerned with the effects recognition of Peking would
have on Canada than with rendering justice to that regim e. The remarks of
Mr. Stewart already noted3 seem to bear out this contention.
This is not to admit the validity of Coldwell’s (and Professor
Lauterpacht's) arguments. When Coldwell said the "bulk of the practice" did
not support the position of those who felt recognition is primarily a political
act, he must have been referring to the fact that in most cases governments
change in a peaceful, constitutional fashion and recognition is automatic. This
would not cause too much controversy. He failed to go further however, and
see that it was in the exceptional c a ses, where extra-legal changes occur,
that the difficulties in recognition occur. It was in the special cases that the
political nature of the act asserts itself. The situation in China could in no
way be classified as being typical change in government and thus Canada was
forced to consider the matter in the light of her own best interests . Positive
international law thoroughly proves that in cases such as China, each country
has the right to decide for itself whether legal conditions have been met and if
recognition will be accorded on those grounds. It would be difficult to find an
example of recognition in a case such as this being granted in the interests of
justice rather than self-in terest.
O

See above, p .5 1 .
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In addition, we must consider the alternatives to a legal duty to
recognize if the conditions are not m et. In this case we either have the
choice of according recognition even though the pre-requisites are lacking
or we have a duty to refrain from recognizing the government. If we have a
choice on what other grounds but political ones will we extend recognition?
On the other hand if we have a duty not to recognize a government when it can
not meet the legal criteria , we are obligated to withhold recognition from or
cut off diplomatic relations with, such governm ents. Thus, if independence
was a condition we could not have recognized the governments of Eastern
Europe . If a readiness to fulfill international obligations was n ecessary (even
though assurance of that intention was not) we should withhold recognition from
countries which had proven that they would ignore these obligations to Canada
or any other state. This alone was enough of a legal argument to bar Commun
is t China from recognition if legal arguments were to be dominant.
Clarence G illis (Cape Breton South) questioned where the responsibi
lity reposed for writing, interpreting and enforcing international law. He
stated, however, that all these fine points of law did not interest him . What did
in terest him was his contention that China now had a communist government be
cause the people felt anything would be better than the previous regim e. If this
is the case Canada must be wary of cutting off China and throwing her into the
Soviet camp. He also felt that it would be a long tim e before anyone had complete
control of China. The British recognition of Peking w as a s m a r t m ove which
Canada should follow for various reasons includingthe establishment of trade. Red
China would eventually enter the United Nations and Canada should try every means
to solve the m ess in China. G illis was glad that Pearson was trying to gauge
public opinion but this public opinion had been confused because of all the double
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talk. Canada, he concluded, should accord recognition when the conditions
Pearson outlined were attained and thus attempt to keep close to the Chinese
people. ^
Stewart re-iterated some of the views he had voiced the previous
November to the effect that we should recognize Communist China before it
is too late to gain advantage from it. It was not a matter of ideology but of
fa c ts . In reference to Drew's plea for a concerted Western policy on recog
nition, he said, "I would suggest further that common action is impossible in
a world of national sovereign states, where what will most appeal to a state
is its national interests."^ The British had recognized for trade motives
while the Americans had not for many reasons including p restig e. Although
the Mao regim e was imposed by force, it was accepted by the m ass of Chinese
peasants, workers and intellectuals. The Nationalists had lost this acceptance
and Formosa was suf fering from their rule and would eventually fa ll.
He stated that it was in Canada's best interests to recognize Peking
but could not say exactly when this should be done. Recognition was described
as a strategic play in the cold war. Non-recognition might surrender by
default leadership in Asia to R ussia. China could not be made into a Soviet
satellite as the other states of the Soviet bloc but neither could she be an ally
of the W est. Our policy therefore, should be to insure her neutrality.
Nationalism is a stronger force in A sia than communism. Drew's legal argu
ments were dism issed as being invalid and were rather moral than legal. Mr.
Stewart wished to get down to the basic realities which would in his opinion
^Debates, March 7, 1950, p p .552-53.
^Debates, p . 555.
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make the folly of non-recognition obvious.
Chinese intervention in Korea forced the C .C .F . to abandon tempo
rarily its arguments for recognition. Recognition could hardly be extended to
a government which was engaged in combat with Canadian troops. However,
Canada, in legal term s, was not at war with Communist China. If purely
legal criteria were being used by the C .C . F . to promote recognition, since
the situation had not changed there was no reason to change its policy. That
there was a shift in the C .C . F . stand indicates they were motivated primarily
by political considerations.
2.

The Post-Korean War Period

When the situation in Korea had been stabilized enough to start
thinking in term s of a cease fire and peace settlem ent, the C .C .F . which had
joined the other parties in refusing recognition after the Chinese intervened
in Korea, did not take long in returning to their original them e. They were
entirely against the United Nations resolution which had branded Red China
an aggressor. Such action, they felt, could only drive Peking into closer ties
with R ussia. Stewart spoke of the importance of insuring peace and removing
any hindrances thwarting the chance for negotiation.
At the same tim e there was another difficulty experienced by
certain nations, ours amongst them. There was the difficulty
we had in trying to talk to China when China was not a member
of the United N ations. It was in refusing such recognition that
the first blunder was com m itted."6
The United States was at fault for this state of affairs in Stewart's opinion.
She had never had to retreat and could not do it graciously then even though
that would have been the w isest policy. China was not Canada's real enemy
^Debates, February 2 , 1951, pp. 65-66.
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in the world at that time but rather it was the Soviet Union that posed the threat
to Canadian security. It was only American pressure which was making Canada
follow an unwise cou rse.
Thus it seem ed that the viewpoint of the C .C . F . had swung full pendu
lum from eschewing recognition of an aggressor to advocating it once more as
a means of maintaining p ea ce. This change came in a very short tim e and it
seem ed to show that the C .C . F . never really changed its original opinion at
■
> all but merely judiciously refrained from stating it at a time when it would have
been very unpopular. They felt the Korean War should not be allowed to mush
room into anything larger and thus it was u se less to hurl recriminations at and
shun Red China. Coldwell summed up his party's attitude.
The C .C .F . does not doubt that the invasion of Korea by the
Chinese arm ies was unjustifiable and contrary to U.N. policy.
But at this moment every effort must be made to prevent a
general war. We must not give way to resentment or hysteria
or assume that war is inevitable. 7
Coldwell maintained his praise of the B ritish position as a realistic
approach. He condemned the Chiang regime for its corrupt record and called
for an end to supporting it. If Canada were to negotiate with the Chinese
Communists we must recognize the Peking regim e. When peace in Korea was
achieved we could then support the Red Chinese entry into the United N ations.
Once that entry was accomplished work could begin on peaceful solutions to
all Far Eastern problem s. Included in this would be an agreement for Formo
san self-determ ination. It seemed to Coldwell that to have peace we must nego
tiate but to negotiate we must recognize Red China and if we should recognize
her we must do everything possible to seat her in the United Nations.
^Debates, February 1, 1951, p . 31. t
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Stewart did not let the statements of W.J . Browne pass without com
m ent. He called Browne a reactionary and a China Lobbyist. The Chinese,
Stewart felt, feared American intentions; perhaps a Korean peace would have
paved the way for a Nationalist invasion from Form osa. The West should
have endeavoured to make the Chinese Communists believe that there was no
intention of overthrowing them by force. Furthermore, he disagreed that
. R ussia controlled China. The Chinese revolution was "revulsion against
m isery , a revolution against foreign domination."9 China and Russia had areas
of conflict and it was our best policy to let these conflicts grow rather than
driving China into Russian arm s because of fear of the W est. This argument
of Stewart's shows the extent to which the C .C .F . was confident that Chinese
Communists were more Chinese than Communist. The C .C . F . theory has
not been proven correct as the Peking regime has shown since that time the
common tendency of new converts, to be extrem ely fanatic.
Coldwell was not about to let the Prim e Minister forget his words of
March 25, 1954 which intimated the efficacy of recognition. Recognition,
*■'* Coldwell felt, should have been accorded in 1949 but was not and the Korean
War made it im possible to grant recognition after that, but with fighting ended
in Korea and negotiations scheduled for Geneva, the time was then ripe. The
Prim e M inister, Coldwell argued, had presented a good case for extending
recognition. He had pointed out things the C.C .F . had b een s a y in g fo r y e a r s .
After illustrating so many good reasons for recognition, however, the Prime
M inister had backed away from it. M oreover, Coldwell was inclined to
Q

°See above p. 38.
9Pebates, March 27, 1952, p . 852.
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believe that by negotiating at Geneva with Red China we are by inference admit
ting recognition of the fact it is the government of C h i n a . H o w e v e r , this view
was unwarranted, as opponents pointed out, as there are precedents which
clearly show contacts such as at Geneva did not constitute recognition if a state
was not willing to grant recognition at the tim e .
The C .C . F . party looked upon recognition as a pre-condition to fruit
ful negotiations leading to the establishment of p eace. Recognition they felt
should be accorded because any other policy hurt the chances of finding solu
tions for Far Eastern problem s. This was the basic reason for their support
of recognition. Political motives surely formed the foundation of the C .C . F .
argumentation in favour of recognition.
3.

T h e C . C . F . During the Conservative Administration

The relative prosperity which had prevailed until 1957 gave way to a
recession and general slowdown in economic growth for the next few yea rs.
This, of course, made its im pression on the political scene and on the question
of recognition of Red China. Trade with China was not a more pressing need
in the eyes of the advocates of recognition. This was especially true in the
case of British Columbia which stood to gain m ost. A good deal of agitation
for recognition came from that province. How much of that was due to the
situation that some outspoken C .C .F . proponents of recognition in the House of
Commons represented British Columbia ridings, is problematical. It would be
safe to say, generally, the province was in favour of recognition, especially in
the light of the harsh effects in that area of the recession .

10Debates, March 27, 1954, p .3341.
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With respect to the issue of trade the C . C . F . party members were as
one. Recognition was a pre-requisite to improving trade relations and for this
reason Canada should have abandoned her blind adherence to a faulty American
policy.
The agitation for recognition was not silenced by the change in govern
ment and many political analysts still wrote favourably of recognition. John D.
Harbron, a political commentator, called the policy of non-recognition a
blem ish on Canada's otherwise good record in international affairs. If Canada
wanted to assum e the role of a mediator in the world it could mediate through
trade with China according to Mr. Harbron. Many American businessm en and
public figures wanted more American trade with China. The feelings of
British Columbia exporters were well known and increased trade in nonstrategic articles was possible*1 That writer failed to mention that neither
Red China nor the United States wanted Canadian mediation at that tim e and
that opinion in the United States was again becoming more militantly opposed
to Peking.
Others, such as Marcus Long, who wrote for the Canadian Commen
tator, felt that Canada in its position as the closest ally of the United States
could recognize China and not upset the Americans too much. "With such an
ally so beloved by Am ericans, so far beyond suspicion, why should Canada
continue to support the fiction M . Faure has so thoroughly scotched."*^ The
fiction referred to was the b elief that the Nationalist government represented
H j . D . Harbron, "Canada and Red China," Canadian Commentator,
(April, 1958), pp.5-6.
12Marcus Long, "The Fiction of China," Canadian Commentator,
(December, 1958), p . 5.
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all of China and M. Faure, a former prime m inister of France had attacked
this idea. "If the Canadian government had the courage of its convictions it
would speak its piece without fear of consequences. Our prestige depends on
our honesty and independence."

l O

Commentators like Harbron and Long who

held to this type of opinion were appalled at the refusal of Canada to recognize
a concrete reality and instead to hold to the myth of Nationalist control.
The C .C . F . party maintained its position in favour of recognition
and came up with several new and interesting arguments. Frank Howard
(Skeena) contended that the United States would one day alter its policy and
gain trade with Red China while Canada would be left in the cold. He pointed
out that British trade with Red China doubled since the end of the Korean W ar.
Beyond the question of trade, Canada had a moral obligation to recognize the
de facto government of China. This was the first time morality entered as
an argument for recognition rather than against it.

14

An independent foreign

-policy and thus recognition of the mainland government continued to be a
favourite weapon of the C . C . F . ^
Harold Winch, (Vancouver Eas t), again outlined his party's view s.
He pointed out that lack of recognition is an insult to a proud people. We
could not depend on the overthrow of the Peking regime as it was solidly en
trenched and had fostered progress even though through very harsh m eans.
The argument that China was won by force and that it was not now a peace
loving state were not important enough to halt recognition as they could be
applied to numerous states that has been recognized. Norman Robertson, the
13Long,
t
_
p . 5.
Debates, May 20, 1958, p . 262.
15

D ebates, August 23, 1958, p p .4017-18.
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American Undersecretary of State for Far Eastern A ffairs, was strongly
against recognition and had come to Canada in early 1959 to specifically out
line the American position. However, Winch felt we would be better served
by listening to prominent Canadians who had travelled to China than American
public servants. We could not ignore China m erely because American policy
called for the maintenance of the N ationalists. To illustrate his remarks
Winch noted that James Muir, president of the Royal Bank of Canada, had r e 
turned from China to report that trade opportunities were present even with
out recognition must com e. D r. Mackenzie, president of the University of
British Columbia, was reported by Winch as having said that Canada had to
get closer to the Orient by recognizing the Peking regim e. Many other peace
loving countries had recognized China; by December 3, 1958, thirty-eight
countries had done so . Canada had recognized other communist victories and
did not tell those countries to expiate their crim es. That was the tim e, he
felt, to cease being an American satellite by according recognition to the Red
Chinese. Trade would result from this for the benefit of Canada and especially
British Columbia. The tim e had come to face the facts and realize that recognition was in Canada's best in terests.

Ifi

In the period 1957-1960, the C . C . F . had made the extension of trade
an important argument for according recognition to Communist China. There
was no legality involved in the C . C . F . desire to increase Canadian m arkets.
As in all other cases the C.C .F . was motivated by political considerations.
^ D eb a tes, March 23, 1959, pp.2159-62.
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V
CONCLUSION
The conclusion to be reached from the study of Canada's consideration
of recognition of the government on the mainland of China is that political con
siderations take precedence over legal on es. This view seem s to be substan
tiated by the im plicit admission in many statements of opponents of recognition
that the Red Chinese government does fulfill the legal requirements for recog
nition but that this cannot in itself be an excuse to accord recognition. Those
who do not admit the legality of the communist position go to the other extreme
and try to cloak their political arguments in legalistic garb. One thing that
seem s evident, however, is the unwillingness of politicians to completely
divorce them selves from legal argum ents. Legality is much more appealing
than political pragmatism. Despite th is, in the final analysis, the realities of
world and domestic conditions are the guidelines which are invoked in making
a decision such as the one that has faced Canada since 1949.
With a realization that political factors are the dominant causes of a
decision for or against recognition of a new government, it is almost a truism
to state that the attitude towards such a decision will vary according to world
and domestic conditions. This indicates how far from a legalistic attitude the
particular problem of recognition in positive international law has gone. From
a legal point of view , what is right in 1949 is also right in 1951 given that the
law does not change in the interim . The political attitude, however, may
change with the tim e s. Thus we note that even the rabid C . C . F . support of
63
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recognition in 1949 had yielded to a realization that such action was not pos
sible in 1951 considering the state of world affairs.
In the majority of cases the recognition of a new government would
render no problem and indeed would almost be automatic. The com plexities
of a strategy imposed by the cold war have dictated that such cannot be the
case with respect to a communist government and especially of one so power
ful and contentious as Red China. A further complication arises from Canada's
relationships with different nations in the world and the variance of the
approach to recognition of Communist China on the part of th ese. Thus Canada
is pulled in opposite directions by the vigorous opposition to recognition of its
strongest ally, the United States, and the staunch support of that policy by
Commonwealth countries with which Canada wishes to maintain close t i e s . A
usually routine facet of international life has thus been turned into a consider
ation in the highest realm of policy.
In the particular case of Canada and Red China, the domestic over
tones cannot be overlooked. The possibilities of huge markets on mainland
China become a strong argument for recognition in tim es of economic distress
in Canada. This is especially true in British Columbia which potentially seem s
in the best position to gain from trad e. On the other hand the French Catholic
population of Canada would feel it m orally inexcusable to recognize the Commun
ist regim e in China. (This is a generalization of course as one could find
numerous French Canadians supporting recognition). The relative inability to
effectively measure public opinion on this issue was one reason for the seem 
ingly hesitant attitude of the Liberal regime until 1957. Many nationalist
sentiments have been raised because of the feeling that recognition is withheld
m erely to follow blindly the United States lead in foreign affairs. We can see
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that a variety of domestic conditions must also be weighed in considering recog
nition .
Thus in summary of the whole problem one must conclude that in the
question of Canadian recognition of Red China we have a situation in which the
usually easily dealt with matter of recognition has become a matter of some
political importance. This has been caused by the fact that it was not a matter
of legality but rather one of political expediency. The labyrinth of conflicting
political considerations, both domestic and international which are all the more
C
confusing because they are not static has prevented a decision which is sa tis
factory to the whole nation. One would almost have to surm ise that this will
be a problem inherent in recognition as long as political considerations are
considered more important than legal ones.
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